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The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which
are deemed to make the most significant contribution to New
York's procedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many
other less important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be
included. While few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped,
that the Survey accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key
the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural
law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to key the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to
him. The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically
treated in the cases are listed under their respective titles.
ARTICLE 2-LMITATONS OF TImE

CPLR 203(e): Relation back of wrongful death action to the
commencentent of personal injury claim allowed.
On a unique set of facts, the court in Berlin v. Goldberg1
allowed the amendment of a timely personal injury complaint to
include a cause of action- for wrongful death where the statute'of
limitations for the amended claims had run. The original action
was commenced in 1963, and a motion to amend the complaint
to include a cause of action for wrongful death was made in 1964,
a year after the death of the plaintiff's deceased. The motion was
originally granted and an amended complaint, including the wrongful death claim, was served on the defendant in 1964. On reargument, however, the motion was denied, and such denial was affirmed
by the appellate division 2 The plaintiff brought the instant motion
under CPLR 203(e), after the statute of limitations for the wrongful death action had run.
Prior to enactment of CPLR 203(e), there was no statutory
provision allowing for the circumvention of a statute of limitations
by the addition, to a timely complaint, of an amendment containing a claim on which the period had run.3 Such amendments were
discretionary with the court, and were governed restrictively by
the rule of Harriss v. Tans.4 That case held that amendments
merely expanding the allegations in the original pleadings were not
barred by the statute of limitations, and thus "related back" to the
first claim. Conversely, however, if the amendment introduced a
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new or different cause of action, a new suit was in fact in issue
and the statute of limitations was available as a defense. 5
To avoid this "expansion - introduction" antithesis, the Advisory Committee proposed CPLR 203(e), 6 based on Rule 15(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 expressly "to overcome
the effect of Harriss v. Tww!.8

Considered more liberal than both Harriss and Rule 15(c)o
CPLR 203(e) was regarded to be especially effective with regard
to amendments which added a statutorily created liability to a
common-law cause of action.0 Since Section 130 of the Decedent
Estate Law created an action for wrongful death, and since Rule
15(c) had not been applied to wrongful death statutes, 1 the test
of the effectiveness of 203(e) would be most apparent in amendments adding a claim for wrongful death to a personal injury
pleading.
In Paskes v. Buonaguro, 2 a personal injury action was not

considered a claim which would give a defendant notice of the
additional facts to be proved upon amendment, so as to allow
203(e) to apply. The court in the instant case, however, dismissed
the Paskes ruling on "relation back" as "obiter dictum" since
CPLR 218, in prohibiting the application of 203(e) to actions
barred by the statute of limitations before September, 1963, was
dispositive of the issue in Paskes.'3
5 Harriss v. Tams, 288 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932). It is interesting
to note that the Court of Appeals quoted and seemingly agreed with

the liberal statement of the Supreme Court in New York Cent. & Hudson

River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 that: "when a defendant has had
notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce

a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute
of limitations do not exist . . . .. However, the Court emphasized the
singularity of "a claim" in devising its own rule.
6CPLR 203 (e)states that: "A claim asserted in an amended pleading
is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original
pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice

of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to
be proved pursuant to the amended pleading."
7FE.

R. Civ. P. 15(c) is of slightly, but significantly different termin-

ology. It provides: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading." See 1 WEINsmiin, KoPX &
MILLER, Nmw YoRK CIVIL PRAcricE 1203.30 (1965).
8 SECOND RE'. 50, 51.
9 1 WEiNsraNi,
KoRN & Mim.L_, NEW YoRx Civm PRA TIcE W203,31
(1965).
10 Id. at f 203.32.
"3 In Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954) the court held:
"Pendency . . . [of] an action for personal injuries does not toll the
statute of limitations on a death claim."
:12
42 Misc. 2d 1004, 249 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963).
' 3 Supra note 1,at 1075, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 477. CPLR 218 was not considered in Ringle v. Bass, 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct.
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Clearly guided by criticisms of the Paskes ruling, and stating
that CPLR 203(e) must be "liberally interpreted," ' 4 the court
ruled that "there is no equitable (or legal) reason why a personal
injury action in the original pleading does not give notice of a
wrongful death, allegedly caused by the original negligent injury.
" 15

What must be borne in mind in relation to the question of
notice is that defendant was aware not only of the facts surrounding the personal injury claim in 1961, but was also served with a
summons and amended complaint including the wrongful death
action in 1964- prior to the tolling of the statute of limitations.
It could perhaps be argued that the instant case is not actually
applying the 203 (e) "relation back" to wrongful death as an action
per se, but rather is merely applying this statute to situations in
which there is actual as well as constructive notice from the pleadings. However, it would seem that both the language of the
court and the intention of the legislature were such as to include
any new claim, provided that "the original complaint gave notice
of the transaction out of which the amended complaint arose." '
CPLR 210(b): Time for commencement of action is not extended
where eighteen-month period after death of potential defendant
expired prior to the running of the statute of limitations.
CPLR 210(b) provides that a "period of eighteen months
after the death . . . of a person against whom a cause of action
exists is not a part of the time within which the action must be
commenced against his executor or administrator." This provision alleviates the difficulty which claimants have during the period
between the potential defendant's death and the appointment of an
executor or administrator of the estate.' 7 It leaves "substantially
unchanged" 1 its predecessor sections, CPA §§ 12 and 21, merely
Ulster County 1965), where, contrary to Paskes, relation back of a wrongful death claim to a personal injury pleading was allowed. See criticism
and evaluation of Ringle v. Bass in The Biannual Survey of New York
Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 303, 307-08 (1966).

l4Supra note 1, at 1077, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
IS Ibid.
16 Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 1075, 266 N.Y.S2d 475, 476

(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct 1966).
17 1 WEINsTmN, KORN & MILLER, Naw Yoan CiviL PRAcricE ff
210.04
(1965). "The Legislature seems to have recognized that there is inevitably
a period of time following the death of a person when it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to commence an action against his estate. In order, therefore, to prevent any hardships or loss of rights to a plaintiff under such
circumstances, the Legislature by the enactment of section 21 suspended the
running of the statute for a period of eighteen months after the death of the
person against whom a cause of action exists." Butler v. Price, 271

App. Div. 359, 362, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (4th Dep't 1946).
IsFTTH REP. 46.

